Communities are an important feature of social networks. In fact, it seems that communities are necessary for a social network to be efficient. However, there exist very few formal studies of the actual role of communities in social networks, how they emerge, and how they are structured. The goal of this paper is to propose a mathematical model to study communities in social networks. For this, we consider a particular case of a social network, namely information networks. We assume that there is a population of agents who are interested in obtaining content. Agents differ in the type of content they are interested in. The goal of agents is to form communities in order to maximize their utility for obtaining and producing content. We use this model to characterize the structure of communities that emerge in this setting. While the proposed model is very simple, the obtained results suggest that it indeed is able to capture key properties of information communities.
Introduction
Communities play an important role in social networks. In fact, it seems that communities are necessary/essential for a social network to work efficiently. However while there exists a large body of work that formally models and studies macroscopic properties of social networks such as the degree distribution and diameter, very little work is available on mathematical models for microscopic properties of communities in social networks. Creating such a model is the topic of this paper. Ideally this model should be simple enough to allow a formal analysis, yet be expressive enough to provide insights into important microscopic properties of communities in social networks.
For our model we focus on a particular type of social networks, to which we refer to as information networks, where agents (individuals) share/exchange information. Sharing/exchanging of information is an important aspect of the social networks, both for social networks that we form in our everyday lives, as well as for online social networks such as for example Twitter.
To model communities in information networks, to which we refer to as information communities, we assume that all content (information) that is being shared is being produced by agents in the network. Furthermore, we assume that different agents have different abilities to produce (generate) content, and different interests in consuming (obtaining) content. Using this setup, we study the situation where agents form communities in order to share/exchange content. We formally model this situation through utility functions that captures the benefit that agents obtain from being in a particular information community, where we assume that agents obtain an utility both from consuming (obtaining) content as well as from producing content. Using this model we study the following questions: a) what is the community structure that emerges under this model, i.e. can we characterize the set of content producers/consumers that form a community, b) what is the content that individual agents will produce in a community, and c) how is content being filtered and distributed within a community.
An interesting outcome of our analysis is that the proposed model, albeit being very simple, indeed seems to be able to provide interesting insights into the microscopic structure of information com-munities. For example, the characterization of how content is being produced, i.e. which content each agent in a community produces, indeed matches what has been experimentally observed in real-life social networks. We discuss this connection in more details in Section 2 and 4.
Another interesting outcome of the analysis is that the proposed model suggests an intriguing connection between content filtering, influence, reputation, and identity in information communities. It is commonly believed that these concepts play an important role in information communities; however there is very little work available that explains why this is the case. While the analysis of the connection between content filtering, influence, reputation, and identity in an information community, presented in this paper is still preliminary, we believe that the proposed model can be used to formally study these concepts. We discuss this in more details in Section 7.
In summary, the contributions of the paper are as follows:
(a) We propose a mathematical model to study information communities that is simple enough to allow a formal analysis. In particular, using a game-theorectic framework, we characterize the community structure that arises under a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, the model is able to capture important microscopic properties of information communities that have been observed in real-life social networks, such as for example the structure of content production in information communities.
(b) The model and analysis gives raise to several interesting questions for future research. In particular, it suggests that the model can be used to formally define and study the concepts of influence, reputation and identity in an information community. To the best of our knowledge, there currently does not exist a formal model that is able to explain how, and whether, these concepts are linked. Being able to formally study influence, reputation and identity in an information community is one of the main motivation behind developing the proposed model, as we believe that this could have a major impact on the formal understanding of social networks, and lead to more efficient algorithms for analyzing social networks, and communities in social networks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss existing work that is most closely related to the model and analysis presented in this paper. In Section 3 we define our mathematical model for information communities, and in Section 4 we present our result on community structures that emerge under a Nash equilibrium. In Section 5 we discuss the implication of these results for implementing information communities in practice. In Section 6 we consider the problem of content filtering in an information community. In Section 7 we discuss the insights obtained from the presented model and analysis, as well as future research.
Related Work
We note that there is a large body work on the experimental and theoretical study of social networks and their properties; due to space constraints we highlight here only the work that is most relevant to the discussion presented in this paper.
There exists extensive work, both experimental and theoretical, on the macroscopic properties of social network graphs such as the small world phenomena, shrinking diameter, and power-law degree distribution. By now there are several mathematical models that describe well these properties; examples of such models are Kroenecker graphs [8] and geometric protean graphs [1] . The difference between this body of work and the model presented here is that these models on the social network graph a) do not explicitly model and analyze community structures, and b) focus on macroscopic properties of the social network graph rather than microscopic properties of communities in social networks.
There is also a large body of work on community detection algorithms (see for example [4] for a survey) including minimum-cut methods, hierarchical clustering, Givran-Newman algorithm, modulartiy maximization, spectral clustering, and many more. In this paper we are not so much concerned with detecting communities (clusters) in a social network (complex graph), but with modeling and characterizing the community structure that emerges in an information network. An interesting approach to community detection is taken in [3] by Chen et al. who use a game-theorectic approach to detect overlapping communities in social networks. In [3] it is assumed that there already exists an underlying social graph for the social network, and the utility that agents obtain when joining a community depends on a) which other agents joined the community and b) the underlying social graph. This is different from the approach in this paper where the utility depends on content production and consumption. In addition, the goal of the work in [3] is to develop an algorithm to detect overlapping communities, whereas in this paper we aim at characterizing the microscopic structure of information communities.
Related to the analysis in this paper is the work on content forwarding and filtering in social networks [2, 5, 6] . In particular the work by Zadeh, Goel and Munagala [2] , and the work by Hegde, Massoulie, and Viennot [6] . In [2] , Zadeh, Goel and Munagala consider the problem of information diffusion in social networks under a broadcast model where content forwarded (posted) by a user is seen by all its neighbors (followers, friends) in the social graph. For this model, the paper [2] studies whether there exists a network structure and filtering strategy that lead to both high recall and high precision. High recall means that all users receive all the content that they are interested in, and high precision means that all users only receive content they are interested in. The main result in [2] shows that this is indeed the case under suitable graph models such as for example Kronecker graphs. In [6] , Hegde, Massoulie, and Viennot study the problem where users are interested in obtaining content on specific topics, and study whether there exists a graph structure and filtering strategy that allows users to obtain all the content they are interested in. Using a game-theoretic framework (flow games), the analysis in [6] shows that under suitable assumptions there exists a Nash equilibrium, and selfish dynamics converge to a Nash equilibrium. The main difference between the model and analysis in [2, 6] and the approach in this paper is that model and analysis in [2, 6] does not explicitly consider and model community structures, and the utility obtained by users under the models in [2, 6] depends only on the content that agents receive, but not on the content agents produce. The work by Gupta et al. [5] does take into account how content forwarding (re-posting) by a user affects the utility of neighbors (followers, friends), and studies how different filtering strategies affect content dissemination. The main result in [5] shows that under suitable social graph models (random graph models) content propagation exhibits a threshold behavior: "high-quality" content spreads throughout the network whereas "low-quality" content does not. Again, this work does not explicitly consider and model community structures. Despite these differences, we believe that the analysis and results presented in [2, 5, 6] are very relevant to the model and results presented in this paper, and can potentially be used to extend our results presented in Section 6 on content filtering. Doing this extension is interesting future research.
There exists an interesting connection between the modeling assumption made by Zadeh, Goel and Munagala in [2] and by Hegde, Massoulie, and Viennot in [6] , and a result obtained in this paper (Proposition 1, Section 4). Both papers [2, 6] make the modeling assumption that users produce content only on a small subset of content that they are interested in receiving. Zadeh, Goel and Munagala support this assumption in [2] through experimental results obtained on Twitter data that shows that Twitter users indeed tend to produce content on a narrower set of topics than they consume. Proposition 1 in Section 4 in this paper provides a formal validation/explanation for this assumption as it shows that under the proposed model it is optimal for agents (users) to produce content on a small subset of the content type that they are interested in consuming. This result illustrates that the proposed model is able to capture and explain important microscopic properties of information networks and communities.
Given a function f : X → R, we say that f is symmetric around y is we have that f (y − δ) = f (y + δ), δ ∈ R.
Content Production and Consumption
We first characterize the space of content types that is being produced and consumed by agents. We assume that each content item is characterized by its type x. We might think of x as a topic or interest. For our analysis, we assume that the content type x is given by a point in a metric space R, i.e. we have that x ∈ R. To simplify the analysis we assume that R is given by the following one-dimensional metric space. The set R is given by an interval [−L, L) ∈ R, and the distance between two points x, y ∈ R is given by the torus metric
where |x| is the absolute value of x.
We assume that different agents are interested in different content types, and have different abilities to produce content. To model this situation, we associate with each agent a center of interest y ∈ R.
Slightly abusing notation, we will refer in the following to an agent by its center of interest y ∈ R.
The interest of agent y ∈ R in content of type x ∈ R is then given by
where f is a non-increasing function. The interpretation of the function p(x|y) is as follows: when agent y reads a content of type x, then it finds it interesting with probability p(x|y) = f (||x − y||).
The ability of agent y ∈ R to produce content of type x ∈ R is given by q(x|y) = g(||x − y||),
is a non-increasing function. The interpretation of this function is as follows. If agent y produces content of type x, then the content will be relevant to content type x with probability q(x|y) = g(||x − y||).
We make the following assumptions for the function f and g that we use to define the functions p(·|y) and q(·|y). This assumption captures the intuition that agents are more interested in content that is close to their center of interest, and produce more relevant content on topics that are close to their center of interest.
In the following we assume that the distribution of agents on the ring is characterized by a density µ(y)dy. To simplify the analysis, we further assume that agents are uniformly distributed and we have that µ(y)dy = dy, y ∈ R.
Information Community
The goal of this paper is to study the structure of information communities which we model as follows. An information community C = (C d , C s ) is characterized by the set C d ⊆ R of agents that consume (read) content, and the set C s ⊆ R of agents that produce content. The subscript in C d in C s refer to "demand", and "supply", respectively. We assume that agents in C d can access all the content that is being produced by agents in C s . In the following we define more precisely how content is being produced and consumed, and the resulting utility functions for content consumption and production.
For a given a community C = (C d , C s ), we assume that each agent y ∈ C s can decide how much effort it puts into producing content of type x. We model this situation as follows. We let β C (x|y), x ∈ R, be the rate at which agent y generates content of type x in community C where β C (·|y) is a non-negative function, i.e. for y ∈ C s we have that
The total rate (over all agents y ∈ C s ) at which content of type x is generated in the community C is then given by
Recall that content of type x that is generated by agent y ∈ C s is relevant to x with probability q(x|y), and that total rate (over all agents y ∈ C s ) at which relevant content is generated in C is equal to
We refer to Q C (x) as the content supply function of community C.
For the content consumption we assume that each y ∈ C p can decide on how much effort it allocates to read (consume) content that is being produced in community C. Let α C (y), α C (y) ≥ 0, be the rate at which agent y ∈ C d reads content in community C, and let the function P C (x) be given by
We refer to P C (x) as the content demand function of community C.
For the reward and cost for consuming content, we make the following assumptions. Agents pay a cost c for reading/consuming a content item, where c is a processing cost that reflects the effort/time required by an agent to read a content item (and decide whether it is of interest or not). If the content item is of interest, then the agent receives a reward equal to 1; otherwise the agent receives a reward equal to 0. The rate µ C (x|y) at which an agent y ∈ C s receives content of type x in community C that is of interest to agent y is given by
. The cost at which y reads content of type x in C, and pays a cost of c, is given by α C (y)β C (x)c.
Combining these two results, the utility rate ("reward minus cost") for content consumption U
The utility rate for content production U (s)
This utility rate has the following interpretation. Note that [q(x|y)p(x|z) − c] is the expected reward that agent z ∈ C d receives from content of type x that is being produced by agent y ∈ C s . Therefore in an economic setting [q(x|y)p(x|z) − c] is the amount (price) that agent z is willing to pay agent y for obtaining from agent y content of type x. In this sense, one interpretation of the utility rate of a content producer y ∈ C s is that it reflects the revenue that y would obtain for the content that y produces in C. An alternative interpretation, and the one we adopt in this paper, is that the utility rate of content producer y ∈ C s reflects the reputation, or "reputation score", of agent y in the community C, i.e. it captures how beneficial the contributions of a content producer y are for the community C.
An interesting aspect of this model is that that total utility rates over all agents for content consumption and content production is the same, i.e. one can show that 
Community Structure
Using the above model, we first study how agents form communities in order to maximize their utility rates. For this, we define a community structure by a triplet (C, {α C (y)} y∈R , {β C (·|y)} y∈R ) where C is a set of communities C as defined in the previous section, and α C (y) = {α C (y)} C∈C and β C (y) = {β C (·|y)} C∈C indicate the rates which content consumers and producers allocate to the different communities
We let D C = ∪ C∈C C d be the set of content consumers, and S C = ∪ C∈C C s be the set of content producers. We assume that the total content consumption and production rates of each agent can not exceed a given threshold, and we have that
and
where
Finally, we require that for a given community structure (C, {α C (y)} y∈R , {β C (·|y)} y∈R ), we have for
i.e. each agent y ∈ C D has a positive content consumption rate α C (y) in community C, and each agent y ∈ C s has a positive total content production rate ||β C (y)|| in community C.
A community structure (C * , {α * C (y)} y∈R , {β * C (·|y)} y∈R ) is a Nash equilibrium if for all y ∈ R we have that 
Note that under a Nash equilibrium each agent in D C * and S C * maximizes its own utility rate. We call a Nash equilibrium a covering Nash equilibrium if
i.e. we have that each agent is a content consumer and producer in at least one community.
To formulate our result on covering Nash equilibria we use the following definition. Given an interval I ⊆ R of length ||I||, we let
be the mid-point (average) of the interval I.
Using this definition, we have the following result.
Proposition 1. If
* we have that
where {I C } C∈C * is a set of mutually non-overlapping intervals of equal length, and for each community C = (I C , I C ) ∈ C * we have that 1. α * C (y) = E p , y ∈ I C , and each agent y ∈ R consumes content in exactly one community. 2. β * C (·|y) = E q δ(x * y − x), y ∈ I C , where
and δ is the Dirac delta function.
3. P C (x) is strictly concave on I C with mid(I C ) = arg max
and a support supp(P C ) such that I C ⊆ supp(P C ). Furthermore, we have that P C (x) is symmetric around y 0 = mid(I C ).
is strictly concave on the support supp(Q * C ), with supp(Q * C ) = I * C ⊆ I C and mid(I C ) = arg max x∈R Q * C (x). Furthermore, we have that Q * C (x) is symmetric around y 0 = mid(I C ).
We have that
Proposition 1 states that there always exists a covering Nash equilibrium (C * , {α * C (y)} y∈R , {β * C (·|y)} y∈R ) with a simple structure, i. e.
(a) we have a set {I C } C∈C * of mutually non-overlapping intervals of equal length, such that each interval I C defines a community
* the set of content producers and consumers are identical, i.e. we have that C d = C s = I C . (c) each agent y ∈ R belongs to exactly one community, and each content producer focuses on producing exactly one type of content given by
Note that unless y = y 0 = mid(I C ), we have that x * y = y, y ∈ C s i.e. agent y ∈ C s does not produce the content type which maximizes its ability function q(x|y). (d) the central agent y 0 = mid(I C ) obtains the largest utility for content consumption and production in community C = (I C , I C ), i.e. the agent y 0 benefits the most from being in community C.
The result of Proposition 1 that each content producer focuses on generating exactly one type of content (see comment (c)) is an interesting result as this behavior has been observed in real-life social networks as discussed in Section 2. Another interesting result of Proposition 1 is that agents do not produce content in which they are most interested, i.e. we have that x * y = y, y ∈ I C and y = y 0 = mid(I C ), but shift their content production to a content type that is closer to the center of interest of the community given by y 0 = mid(I C ). It would be interesting to verify whether this predicted behavior is indeed observed in real-life information networks.
We furthermore have the following result for covering Nash equilibria.
is a covering Nash equilibrium as given by Proposition 1 and L I is the length of the intervals {I C } C∈C * , then we have that
This proposition provides a bound on the maximal length of an interval I C that defines a community in a covering Nash equilibrium. It states that the higher the processing cost c, the smaller q(0) and the faster the function f (x) decays, the smaller the size of a community will be. Note that a fast decay in f implies that agents are interested in a very narrow range of content topics; and hence the result of Proposition 2 is a property that one would expect for information communities.
Discussion
The results in this section suggest that the proposed model is indeed simple enough to obtain analytical results. For example the demand and optimal supply functions P C (x) and Q * C (x), respectively, have a "nice" mathematical structure in the sense that they are strictly concave (on their support). This simple structure that should make it possible to use the results for further analysis. We provide an example of such a further analysis in Section 6 where we discuss content filtering within an information community. Furthermore, as discussed above, Proposition 1 and 2 provide interesting insights into microscopic properties of information communities; some properties that have already been observed in social networks, and other properties that would be interesting to verify through experimental studies. However, the model has its limitations and fails to capture some properties of information communities that have been observed in practice. The most striking limitation is that it fails to capture that communities in actual information networks tend to have a hierarchical and overlapping structure. We believe that the reason that Proposition 1 fails to accurately capture this property is that the presented analysis is limited to a one-dimensional metric space (for characterizing the content types) with homogeneous agents whose interest are uniformly distributed. Extending the analysis to more general settings is an interesting future research.
Implementation of Information Communities
In the previous section we study the existence of a Nash equilibrium under our model. An insight obtained from the analysis is that agents need to know the supply functions Q * C (x) and the functions q(x|y)P C (x) of the different communities C ∈ C * in order decide which community to join, and which content to produce in a community. In practice, it is not reasonable to assume that agents have a priori access to this information, but there needs to be an additional mechanism for agents to obtain/accurately estimate these functions. In this section, we will discuss two such approaches namely a "centralized" approach that uses a bulletin board for agents in a community to share/exchange content, and a "distributed" approach where agents connect with each other to form a network that can be used to share/exchange content.
We first consider an approach where each community C has its own bulletin board where agents y ∈ C s can post content, and agents y ∈ C d can obtain/read the content. As agents y ∈ C d have access to all posted (produced) content in the community, this provides them a means to estimate the function Q * C (x). Furthermore, by allowing agents y ∈ C d to indicate which content they found of interest ("like"), agents y ∈ C s have a means to estimate q(x|y)P C (x) and to decide which content x * y to produce. Indeed, bulletin board/forums are a popular form for people interested in similar topics to create an information community.
Another approach to implement a information community is to allow agents in a community to connect with each in order to form a (social) network that can be used to share/exchange content. In this approach, each agent can decide a) from which agent(s) to receive content and b) how to filter content, i.e. each agent can decide for each content item that it has received whether it will forward/share it with other agents. A natural question to ask what is the optimal network and filtering structure, i.e. how should agents connect with each other and filter content in order to maximize their utility rates for content consumption and production. As noted in Section 2 this question is very much related to the work on content forwarding and filtering in social networks as considered in [2, 6] ; however here we consider both utility for content consumption and production, where as in [2, 6] only utility for content consumption is considered. We consider this approach in the following section.
Content Filtering in Information Communities
In the following we assume that we are given community C that is a covering Nash equilibrium as described in Proposition 1, i.e. we have that C = (C d , C s ) with C d = C s = I C ⊆ R. The agents y ∈ I C form a network by creating connection to other agents, where each agent can decide a) from which agent(s) to receive content and b) how to filter content, i.e. agent y can decide for each content item that it has received whether it will forward/share the content with agents that receive content from y.
For our analysis we assume that the filtering function of for content of type x by agent y ∈ I C is given
is a non-increasing function. Note that this assumption captures the intuition that agent y is more likely to relay (filter through) content that is close to its center of interest y.
For a given agent y ∈ I C , let F y be the set of all admissible filtering function, i.e. all functions
is a non-increasing function.
Optimal Agent for Content Filtering
We first consider a simplified scenario where we assume that one agent (or a small subset of all agents) does the content filtering on the behalf of the community, i.e. we assume that all agents y ∈ I C forward their produced content to a single agent y f ∈ I C that does the content filtering for the community, and all content that is filtered through by y f is forwarded to all agents y ∈ I C . The questions that we want to study for this case is a) which is the optimal agent to do the content filtering for the community, b) what is the optimal filtering function that this agent should use, and c) how does the content consumption utility under this scheme compare with the utility obtained under the allocation given by Proposition 1.
The following lemma characterizes the total utility over a community in the case where one agent y ∈ I C filters content on behalf of the community using a filtering function f (·|y) ∈ F y . Recall that under the proposed model the total utility (over all agents in the community) for content consumption and content production are identical. We have the following result that follows immediately from the definition of the model and the filtering function.
is a covering Nash equilibrium as given by Proposition 1 and let {I C } C∈C * be the set of intervals that define the communities, i.e. we have that C = (I C , I C ), C ∈ C * . If agent y ∈ I C does the filtering for the community C with the filtering function r(·|y) ∈ F y , then the total utility rate for content consumption and production over all agents y ∈ I C are the same, and given by
Using this lemma, the optimal agent to do the filtering on behalf of the community is the agent is given as follows. Proposition 3. Let (C * , {α * C (y)} y∈R , {β * C (·|y)} y∈R ) be a covering Nash equilibrium as given by Proposition 1 and let {I C } C∈C * be the set of intervals that define the communities, i.e. we have that C = (I C , I C ), C ∈ C * . Given an interval I C , C ∈ C * , we have that
This result states that the central agent y 0 = mid(I C ) is the optimal agent to do the content filtering for the community C = (I C , I C ). This result suggest that the agent y 0 = mid(I C ) should play a "central" role for content filtering in an information community. We will comment on this in more details in Section 7.
Next, we study which is the optimal filtering function r * (·|y 0 ) that agent the optimal agent y 0 should use for the content filtering in order to maximize the the total utility for content consumption, as well as content production, over all agents in the community. We have the following result.
be a covering Nash equilibrium as given by Proposition 1 and let {I C } C∈C * be the set of intervals that define the communities, i.e. we have that C = (I C , I C ), C ∈ C * . For a given interval I C , C ∈ C * , with y 0 = mid(I C ), let
is optimal in the sense that r * (·|y) = arg max r(·|y)∈Fy x∈I
Furthermore, the total utility rates for content consumption and production over all agents y ∈ I C under r * (·|y) is given by
This result states that a simple threshold filtering function is optimal, i.e. the central agent y 0 forwards (filters through) all content that is sufficient interest to y 0 , and that the total utility rate is the same as one obtained for the community structure in Proposition 1. This result is encouraging as it states that a simple and intuitive filtering structure leads to the same total utility rate as the one obtained under a centralized approach.
The Role of Experts for Content Filtering
In the previous section we studied the question of which agent is best suited to do the content filtering for the community. Next, we consider the question of which agent is best suited to filter out nonrelevant content for a given content type x ∈ R. The reason why this is an issue is as follows.
Recall that agent y ∈ I C that produces content of type x * y will indeed succeed in producing content that is relevant to x * y with probability q(x * y |y). Or in other words, with probability 1 − q(x * y |y) the content produced by agent y on topic x * y is not relevant. Rather than distributing non-relevant content within the community, it would be better to remove it (filter it out) early on. Furthermore, recall that unless y is equal to the central agent y 0 , x * y is not equal to the center of interest of agent y. These observation lead us to consider the following content filtering scheme where "experts" are being used to filter-out non-relevant content for a given topic x. Instead of forwarding its produced content to the central agent y 0 = mid(I C ), agent y forwards its produced content to an expert agent y ′ ∈ I C such that y ′ = x * y . The expert agent y ′ then forwards the received content from agent y to the central agent y 0 if it finds the content to be of interest, otherwise it discards it. The central agent then filters content according to the optimal filtering rule given in Proposition 4, and all filtered through content is forwarded to all agents y ∈ I C . Note that the probability that content produce by agent y will be forwarded by the expert agent y ′ = x * y to the central agent y 0 is given by q(x * y |y)f (0). We have the following result for this filtering scheme. Proposition 5. Let (C * , {α * C (y)} y∈R , {β * C (·|y)} y∈R ) be a covering Nash equilibrium as given by Proposition 1 and let {I C } C∈C * be the set of intervals that define the communities, i.e. we have that C = (I C , I C ), C ∈ C * . For a given community C = (I C , I C ), C ∈ C * , if we have that
then there exists a threshold t C such that by using for all content x * y such that P C (x * y ) ≤ t C expert filters, and by submitting the content produced by all y ∈ I directly to y 0 without expert filtering, will lead to a strictly higher total utility rate for content consumption and production over all agents y ∈ I C than the one obtained without expert filtering given by
This result states that expert filtering can lead to a strictly higher total utility rate compared with the total utility rate; however expert filtering should not be applied to all agents, but only to agents who produce content that is not sufficiently popular in the community. It is to verify through an experimental study whether this prediction on expert filtering is indeed observed in information networks. Another interesting result of Proposition 5 is that a distributed implementation of content filtering which uses expert filtering can lead to a strictly higher total utility rate compared with a centralized approach. This suggests that implementing information communities in a distributed manner is advantageous with respect to maximizing the utility rates.
Discussion
While the filtering schemes that we consider in this section are simplified schemes where content filtering is done either by the central agent y 0 , or by experts, the obtained result provides two interesting insights/hypotheses: it suggests/predicts that 1) the central agent y 0 plays a key role in content filtering in information communities, and 2) one should be able to observe expert filtering in information communities, however not for all agents but only for agents who produce content that is not sufficiently popular in the community. We discuss these two insights, on how they relate to observations made in actual information networks, in more details in the following section.
Insights and Future Research
In this section we discuss the insights that we obtained from the analysis of the proposed model, and how this insights matches with observations that have been made for real-life social networks. Furthermore, we discuss several directions for future research.
Content Filtering and Influence
The analysis in Section 6 predicts that one should be able to observe the following two mechanism for content filtering in an information community: a) content filtering by the central agent y 0 = mid(I C ) to decide which content is relevant for the community (Proposition 3), and b) content filtering by experts to decide whether the content produced by agent y is indeed relevant content (Proposition 5). The interesting aspect of this result is that this structure seems to capture what has been observed for online social networks. In particular, it seems to reflect the structure that has been observed by Sha, Quercia and Dell'Amico in a study on trend makers (agents who generate trends) and trend spotters (agents who spread trends) in an online social application to share pictures of "cool items" [10] . By analyzing a complete dataset of user interactions in this application, it was found that trend spotters and trend makers exhibit very different patterns of behavior. Whereas trend makers generate and vote on very specific content types, trend spotters preferentially engage in content voting and do so across a broad range of content types. Moreover, trend makers tend to vote on content that is different from the type of content that they produce. This behavior seems to reflect the results obtained in the analysis of this paper by letting the central agent(s) y 0 who does content filtering for the community corresponds to trend spotters, and let the remaining agents y ∈ I C who focus on creating content for a specific content type x * y , and are experts for content type y, correspond to trend makers. The results on filtering in Section 6 also reflect results of studies in the fields of sociology, marketing and political science that have been carried out to understand influence in a social network. The traditional view on influence [7, 9] states that a minority of agents, called influential, in a society (community) possess qualities that allow them be successful in spreading trends/ideas to others. These agents drive trends on behalf of the majority of ordinary people. However, more recently this view has been challenged by studies that suggest (in homogeneous networks) influential were no more successful in creating trends than ordinary people (agents) [11] . This observation lead to the term "accidental influentials" for trend creates/adopters. Interestingly, both of these two views are supported by the results of Section 6 where "ordinary" agents y ∈ I C create the content that is being diffused through the community, however it is the influential, i.e. the central agent(s) y 0 = mid(I C ), that decides whether this content is being propagated to the whole community and becomes a trend. As such, influentials (the central agent(s) y 0 ) are no more likely to create content that will become a trend than other agents in the community; however influential do decide which content created in the community will indeed become a trend. While these analogies are still somewhat "speculative", we believe that they provide interesting evidence that the proposed model could potentially be used to formally understand influence, as well as the creation and diffusion of trends (cascades), in information communities. This is an ongoing research.
Content Production and Reputation
The analysis presented in the paper also provides an interesting new perspective on the concept of reputation within a community. It suggests that instead of thinking of reputation as a mechanism to assess the "trust-worthiness" of an agent, reputation in information communities is an important feedback mechanism that allows agents to determine which content to produce as suggested by Proposition 1, i.e. by maximizing their reputation agents y ∈ I C will focus on producing content of type x * y that maximizes the overall content consumption utility (over all agents) in a community. This result suggests that reputation is a key mechanism to ensure that a community functions efficiently, i.e. that agents produce content that is of interest to the community. We are not aware of any prior formal work that suggested this link between reputation and the optimal content production in an information community.
Content Production under a Distributed Approach
The analysis in Section 4 suggests that its important for agents y ∈ I C to be able to estimate the the quantity q(x|y)P C (x) in order to determine what content type x * y to produce. In the centralized implementation of an information community considered in Section 5, this can be achieve by accessing the number of up votes content posted on the bulletin board receives. An interesting research question is to find a mechanism to estimate q(x|y)P C (x) for the distributed implementation of an information community. One simple idea to achieve this is by letting the central agent y 0 = mid(I C ) attach a "reputation indicator/award" to content that it filters through according to the filtering rule described in Section 6. More precisely, the central agent y 0 attaches to content of type x a "reputation award" with probability P C (x). This approach has the advantage that the central agent would estimate P C (x) on the behalf of the community, i.e. instead of each agent replicating the effort to estimate P C (x), this effort would be distributed on (a few) central agent(s) y 0 . To estimate P C (x), the central agent has to be able to estimate (on average) how agents in the community are interested in content of type x. This approach has the advantage that both information on which content is being distributed in the community (i.e. is filtered through by the central agent), and how popular is this content (i.e. how this content receives an reputation award by the central agent), can be obtained by observing the action of the central agent y 0 . A formal analysis of such a scheme is an interesting future research.
Community Formation and Identity
Proposition 1 in Section 4 characterizes a community structure that emerges in an information network using the concept of a Nash equilibrium. A natural, and important, follow-up question to this result is whether there exists a (distributed) mechanism that allows for the formation of a Nash equilibrium community structure. Studying this question is beyond the scope of this paper, however we would like to comment on an intriguing issue that is related to this question; namely how an information community is identified. Note that for an agent to join an information community, it has to be able to be aware that such a community exists, and be able to identify members of the community that it can connect to. Or in other words, there should be a common label/identifier among all members in the community that is being used as a means to identify the community. An interesting hypothesis in this context is that the central agent y 0 = mid(I C ) is a natural choice as a label to identify a community. Note that in our model y 0 also corresponds to the central content type that is being produce in the community. This means that a community could equivalently be identified through its central content type y 0 , or through its central agent y 0 . Continuing the hypotheses of the previous subsection which suggests that the central agent(s) y 0 correspond to the influentials in a community, this suggests that influentials (influential agents) do not only play an important role for content filtering within a community, but might also play an important role in identifying a community, i.e. defining the "identity" of a community.
The Role of Influential Agents
Maybe the most intriguing aspect of the above discussion is that it provides a hint for why having influential people is so important for an information community. It seems that most (if not all) communities do have influential people, which suggests that influential people are essential for a community to work properly. However we are not aware of any formal analysis that is able to explain why this is the case. The analysis in this paper, and the discussion in the previous subsections, suggests that influential people are indeed essential to an information community as they are central position to a) do the content filtering within a community and b) determine the reputation score of an agent within a community, and they can be used to c) identify the community. Using the proposed model to study these connections in more detail is an interesting future research.
Conclusions
We proposed a mathematical model to study communities in information networks. The model is simple enough to allow for a formal analysis, and can be used to get insight into important properties of information communities. The most intriguing aspect of the paper is that the proposed model can potentially be used to formally study influence, reputation and identity in an information community. Extending the presented analysis to study these issues is future research. However, the model has its limitations and fails to capture some properties of information communities that have been observed in practice. For example, it fails to capture that communities tend to have a hierarchical and overlapping structure. We believe that the reason for this is that the current model and analysis is limited to a one-dimensional metric space (for characterizing the content types) with homogeneous agents whose interest are uniformly distributed. Extending the analysis to more general settings of the is interesting future research.
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A Preliminary Results
In this appendix we derive several results that we will use to prove the main results of the paper given by Proposition 1 to 5. For this, we consider communities given by C = (C d , C s ) which have the property that C d = C s = I C , where I c ⊆ R is given by an interval. In the following we characterize for this case the demand function P C (x), x ∈ R, the optimal supply function Q * C (x), x ∈ R, as well as the utility functions U 
A.1 Properties of P C (x)
We start out by characterizing the demand function P C (x), x ∈ R, for a community C = (C d , C s ) with C d = C s = I C , where I c ⊆ R is an interval. Recall that in this case the function P C (x) is given by
then we have that (a) P C (x) is symmetric around y 0 = mid(I C ).
(b) P C (x) is strictly increasing on the interval [mid(I C ) − L, mid(I C )), and strictly decreasing on the interval (mid(I C ), mid(I C ) + L) and we have that
(c) P C (x) is strictly concave in x on the interval I C .
Proof. Without loss of generality we can assume that the interval I C is given by
Note that for the case considered in the lemma we have that
Note that we have that
and it follows that P C (x) is symmetric around y 0 = mid(I C ) = 0.
Setting s = y − x we have that
For x ∈ (0, L) we have that ||∆ − x|| > ||∆ + x|| and it follows that
as by Assumption 1 the function f is strictly decreasing on [0, 2L]. Similarly, for x ∈ [−L, 0)) we have that ||∆ − x|| < ||∆ + x||
Finally, for x = 0 we have that
This establishes that P C (x) is strictly increasing on the interval [mid(I C )−L, mid(I C )), and strictly decreasing on the interval (mid(I C ), mid(I C ) + L), and that
Furthermore for x, x ′ ∈ (0, ∆) such that x < x ′ , we have
as the function f is strictly decreasing, and for x, x ′ ∈ (0, ∆ such that x < x ′ we have
By the same argument, for x, x ′ ∈ [−∆, 0] such that x > x ′ we have
and it follows that that the function P C (x) is strictly concave on I C = [−∆, ∆].
A.2 Optimal Content Production Rate β * C (x|y)
Given a community C = (C d , C s ) such that C d = C s = I C , where I c ⊆ R is an interval, we next study how an agent y ∈ C s optimally allocates its content production β C (·|y) for the community C under the constraint that
where β C (y) > 0 denotes the maximal production rate of agent y can allocate to community C. We denote with β * C(·|y) the optimal production rate allocation, i.e we have that β * C (·|y) = arg max β(·|y):||β(·|y)||≤βC(y) x∈R β C (x|y)(q(x|y)P C (x) − α C c)dx.
We have the following result. Proposition 6. Let C = (C d , C s ) be a community such that C d = C s = I C , where I c ⊆ R is an interval, and let y ∈ C s = I C . If
where d is the Dirac delta function, x * y is the unique solution to the optimization problem max x∈R q(x|y)P C (x), and for y ∈ I C we have
Furthermore for y ∈ I C such that y ≤ mid(I C ), we have that
and for y ≥ mid(I C ) we have that
Proposition 6 follows directly from the following Lemma 3 to 6, combined with the fact that if
then the optimal allocation β * C(x|y) is given by
where I c ⊆ R is an interval, and let y ∈ I C be an agent in C s = I C . If
is twice differentiable with respect to x on R\{y}.
Proof. Recall that the function q(x|y) is by Assumption 1 differentiable with respect to x, and we have that d
. Furthermore, we have that
The results then follows from Assumption 1 which implies that p(x|y) and q(x|y) are twice differentiable with respect to x on R\{y}.
For y ∈ I C such that y < mid(I C ),
we have that the function
is strictly concave on the interval [y, mid(I C )] ∩ supp(q(·|y)). Furthermore, for
we have that q(x|y)P C (x) is strictly concave on the interval [mid(I C ), y] ∩ supp(q(·|y)).
Proof. We first consider the case where y < mid(I C ). By Assumption 1 we have that the function q(·|y) is twice differentiable and strictly concave on the [y, mid(I C )] ∩ supp(q(·|y)), and by Lemma 2 we have that the function P C (x) is twice differentiable and strictly concave on the [y, mid(I C )] ∩ supp(q(·|y)). Furthermore, by Assumption 1 the function q(·|y) is strictly decreasing on [y, mid(I C )] ∩ supp(q(·|y)), and by Lemma 2 the function P C (x) is strictly increasing on [y, mid(I C )] ∩ supp(q(·|y)). If follows that
and the result follows for the case where y < mid(I C ). The case where y > mid(I C ) is obtained using the same argument. 
Furthermore, let the set A ⊆ R be given by
Proof. As the term α C c does not depend on x, optimizing the function
is equivalent to optimizing the function x∈R β C (x|y)q(x|y)P C (x)dx.
We prove the lemma by contradiction. That is, suppose that β * C (x|y) is an optimal solution, i.e. we have that β * C (·|y) = arg max β(·|y):||β(·|y)||≤βC(y) x∈R
Note that this implies that for the set B = R\A we have that Finally, we pick a point x * ∈ A and set
where δ is the Dirac delta function. Note that for the function β ′ C (·|y) we have that
Furthermore, we have that
This leads to a contradiction, and it follows that if β * C (·|y) = arg max β(·|y):||β(·|y)||≤βC(y) x∈R
then we have that
Furthermore, for an optimal allocation β * C (·|y) we have that
It follows that if max
then it is optimal to set β * C (y) = β C (y), i.e. to allocate all the available content allocation rate β C (y) to content in the set A. If
then it is optimal to set β * C (y) = 0. The result then follows. Lemma 6. Let C = (C d , C s ) be a community such that C d = C s = I C , where I c ⊆ R is an interval, and let y ∈ C s = I C . If
then there exists a unique solution to the optimization problem
Proof. Suppose that we have that y < mid(I C ). In this case, we have by Assumption 1 that the function q(x|y) is strictly increasing on the interval
and strictly decreasing on the interval
By Lemma 2 we have that the function P C (x) is strictly increasing on the interval [mid(I C ) − L, mid(I C )), and strictly decreasing on the interval [mid(I C ), mid(I C ) + L). Furthermore, note that q(x|y)P C (x) ≥ 0, x ∈ supp(q(·|y)), and q(x|y)P C (x) = 0, x / ∈ supp(q(·|y)). It then follows that if
Finally, by Lemma 4 the function q(x|y)P C (x) is strictly concave on the interval given by [y, mid(I C )] ∩ supp(q(·|y)), and the results follows.
A.3 Properties of Q * C (x)
Having studied in the previous subsection the optimal content production rate allocation for a com- For this, we focus in our analysis on feasible communities for content producers that are defined as follows. Definition 1. Given a community C = (C d , C s ) and a rate allocations for content consumption
We have the following result. Proposition 7. Let C = (C d , C s ) be a community such that C d = C s = I C , where I c ⊆ R is an interval, and let {α C (y)} y∈C d be a rate allocation for content consumption such that
Let {β * C (·|y)} y∈Cs with ||β * C (·|y)|| = E q , y ∈ C s = I C , be the corresponding optimal content production rate allocation given by
If C is a feasible community for content producers y ∈ C s under {α C (y)} y∈C d , then for the optimal content supply function Q * C (x) given by Proof. Recall the definition
that is used in Proposition 7 to define the function Q * C (x). The lemma then follows directly from the fact that by Lemma 2 the function P C (x) is symmetric around y 0 = mid(I C ), and that by Assumption 1 we have that for
where I c ⊆ R is an interval, and let {α C (y)} y∈C d be a rate allocation for content consumption such that
If C is a feasible community for content producers y ∈ C s under {α C (y)} y∈C d , then for
we have that for y, y
Proof. First suppose that we have that
Recall that by Lemma 3 the function q(x|y)P C (x) is differentiable, and by Lemma 2 the function P C (x) is strictly concave on I C . Let
and ∆ = ||y − y ′ ||.
Note that we have that
and it follows that
Note that by Lemma 2 P C (x) is strictly concave on I C , as well as
and by Proposition 6 we have that
Furthermore we have that C is a feasible community for content producers y ∈ C s under {α C (y)} y∈C d , and from Lemma 2 we have that
and g(ǫ y ) > 0 and g(ǫ y ′ ) > 0.
Combing the above equations, it follows that
Using a similar argument, we have that
and the result follows.
Lemma 9. Let C = (C d , C s ) be a community such that C d = C s = I C , where I c ⊆ R is an interval, and let {α C (y)} y∈C d be a rate allocation for content consumption such that
,
Then by Lemma 8 there exist ǫ y ′ , δ > 0 such that
and in order to prove the lemma for y < y ′ ≤ mid(I C ) we have to show that
or that for
Recall that by Assumption 1 we have that g is decreasing and strictly concave convex on the support supp(g), and it follows that
and by Lemma 2 that P ′ C (x * y ′ ) ≥ 0. As C is a feasible community for content producers y ∈ C s under {α C (y)} y∈C d we have that
and for y, y
Using a similar argument, we have y, y
If C is a feasible community for content producers y ∈ C s under {α C (y)} y∈C d , then the function
Proof. Let the function h(x, y) be given by h(x, y) = q(x|y)P C (x), x, y ∈ I C , and let
Note that by Proposition 6 we have that for y ∈ I C that x * y ∈ I C , as well as that F (x * (y), y) = F (x * y , y) = 0, x * y , y ∈ I C . Furthermore by Proposition 6, for a given y ∈ I C there exists a unique x * y ∈ I C such that F (x * y , y) = 0, and by Lemma 9 we have for y, y ′ ∈ I C with y = y ′ , that
As C is a feasible community for content producers y ∈ C s under {α C (y)} y∈C d we have that
Combining this result with Assumption 1 and Lemma 3, we have that the function F (x, y) is continuously differentiable at (x * y , y), y ∈ I C , with respect to y. Finally,by Proposition 6, for a given y ∈ I C there exists a unique x * y ∈ I C such that F (x * y , y) = 0, and by Lemma 9 we have that y, y ′ ∈ I C , y = y ′ , that
and the result follows from the implicit function theorem.
Lemma 11. Let C = (C d , C s ) be a community such that C d = C s = I C , where I c ⊆ R is an interval, and let {α C (y)} y∈C d be a rate allocation for content consumption such that
If C is a feasible community for content producers y ∈ C s under {α C (y)} y∈C d , then the image of the function x * (y) given by
is given by an interval I * C ⊆ I C .
Proof. As the interval I is a connected set and by Lemma 10 the function x * (y) is continuous on I C , it follows that the image of x * (y) ,y ∈ I C , is a connected set and hence given by an interval I * Proof. The result that Q * C (x) is strictly concave and the support supp(Q * C (x) follows directly from Lemma 8 and 9, combined with the fact that by Assumption 1 the function g that is used to define q(x|y), is concave on [0, L).
follows directly from the fact that Q * C (x) is strictly concave and the support supp(Q * C (x) and symmetric around y 0 = mid(I C ).
A.4 Feasible Communities
In this subsection we consider feasible communities that we define as follows. Definition 2. Given a community C = (C d , C s ) and a rate allocations for content production {β C (·|y)} y∈Cs such that
we call C a feasible community for content consumers
where Q c (x) = y∈Cs β C (x|y)q(x|y)dy.
Definition 3.
Given a community C = (C d , C s ) and a rate allocations {α C (y)} y∈Cs and {β C (·|y)} y∈Cs such that
we call C a feasible community under {α C (y)} y∈Cs and {β C (·|y)} y∈C d if C is a feasible community for content producers under {α C (y)} y∈Cs , and a feasible community for content consumers under {β C (·|y)} y∈C d .
Note that a community C under a Nash equilibrium as given in Proposition 1 is always a feasible community under the corresponding rate allocations. Therefore, a necessary condition for a community C with rate allocations {α C (y)} y∈Cs and {β C (·|y)} y∈Cs to be part of a Nash equilibrium is that it is a feasible community under these rate allocations.
Next we considers communities
For this case we shows that when the length of the interval ||I C || is not too long, then there always exist rate allocations {α C (y)} y∈Cs and {β C (·|y)} y∈Cs such that C is a feasible community under {α C (y)} y∈Cs and {β C (·|y)} y∈C d .
where I c ⊆ R is an interval, and let
If the interval length ||I C || is such that
then for all rate allocations {α C (y)} y∈Cs and {β C (·|y)} y∈Cs such
as well as
the community C a feasible community under {α C (y)} y∈Cs and {β C (·|y)} y∈C d .
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
Recall that the utility rate for content producers y ∈ C s = I C is given by
As supp(q(·|y)) ⊆ I C , y ∈ C s , by Assumption 1 we then have that
Therefore if we have that
and the community C is feasible for content producers y ∈ C s under the rate allocations {α C (y)} y∈Cs .
Similarly, for the utility rate for content consumers y ∈ C d = I C we have that
and the community C is feasible for content consumers y ∈ C d under the rate allocations
The result then follows.
A.5 Optimal Community Selection for Content Consumers and Producers
In this subsection, we are given a community structure (C, {α C (y)} y∈R , {β C (·|y)} y∈R ) and an agent y ∈ R, and study which is the optimal allocation for content consumption α * C (·|y) and content production β * C (·|y) such that ||α * C (·|y)|| ≤ E p and ||β * C (·|y)|| ≤ E q , where E p > 0 and E q > 0.
We have the following results. Lemma 14. Let (C, {α C (y)} y∈R , {β C (·|y)} y∈R ) be a given community structure, let y ∈ R be a given content consumer, and let E p > 0 be a positive scalar. If we have that
then the optimal content consumption rate allocation for y is given by
i.e. we have that
Proof. This result follows directly from the definition of the utility rate
which is linear in α C (y).
Lemma 15. Let (C, {α C (y)} y∈R , {β C (·|y)} y∈R ) be a given community structure, let y ∈ R be a given content producer, and let E q > 0 be a positive scalar. If we have that max
then the optimal content production rate allocation for y is given by
where 
Proof. By Proposition 6, we have that if agent y allocates the content production rate β C (y) given by
to community C, then the optimal utility rate for content production for agent y in community C is given by
if C is a feasible community for content producers under the allocation {α C (y)} y∈C d . Let β * C (·|y) be the rate allocation for content production as given in the lemma, and let β C (·|y) be an alternative allocation such that
To prove the lemma, we have to prove that the utility rate for content production for agent y is not higher under the allocation β C (·|y) compared with allocation β * C (·|y). Note that the optimal utility rate for y under β * (y) is given by
and the optimal utility rate for y under β C (·|y) is given by
Note that
As by assumption we have that max
A.6 Properties of Utility Rates for Content Consumption and Production
In this section we study the properties of the utility rates for content consumption and production. We have the following results. Lemma 16. Let (C * , {α * C (y)} y∈R , {β * C (·|y)} y∈R ) be a community structure as given by Proposition 1, i.e. for each community C = (C d , C s ) ∈ C * we have that
where {I C } C∈C * is a set of mutually non-overlapping intervals of equal length, and for each community C ∈ C * we have that α * C (y) = E p , y ∈ I C , and
Then for a community C = (I C , I C ) ∈ C * the utility rate for content consumption given by
has the property that U
Proof. By symmetry, for y, y ′ ∈ R such that
Therefore to prove the lemma, it suffices to consider agents y, y ′ such that
Without loss of generality, we can assume that
Furthermore, using Proposition 7, we have that
where we also used the fact that the function Q C * (x) is symmetric with respect to y 0 = mid(I C ) = 0.
Note that by Assumption 1 we have that
For the proof, we are considering two cases: one when y ∈ [−∆ * , 0) and one where y ∈ (−L, −∆ * ).
For we case where y ∈ [−∆ * , 0), the derivative of the utility rate with respect to y is given by
where f ′ is the derivative of f .
we obtain that
where we note that ∆ * + y ≥ 0 as we consider the case where y ∈ [−∆ * , 0). 
Recall that by
where we used that fact that by Assumption 1 the derivative f ′ is strictly negative on [0, ∆ * + y]. Furthermore we have that
and f is strictly decreasing on [0, L). Combining these results, we obtain for
For we case where y ∈ (−L, −∆ * ), the derivative of the utility rate with respect to y is given by
By the same argument as above, we have for this case that
The same argument as given for the two cases where y ∈ [−∆ * , 0) and y ∈ (−L, −∆ * ), the results can be shown for the two cases where y ∈ (0, ∆ * ] and y ∈ (∆ * , L). The lemma then follows.
Lemma 17. Let (C * , {α * C (y)} y∈R , {β * C (·|y)} y∈R ) be a covering Nash equilibrium as given by Proposition 1. Then for a community C = (I C , I C ) ∈ C * the utility rate for content production given by U (s)
has the property that U (s)
Without loss of generality, we consider an interval community I C = [−∆, ∆], ∆ > 0. Let y 0 = mid(I C ) = 0 be the central agent of the interval I C .
Consider two agents y, y ′ ∈ I C with y < y ′ < y 0 .
Then by Lemma 9 we have that x * y < x * y ′ and P C (x * y ) ≤ P C (x * y ′ ) as by Lemma 2 the function P C (x) is strictly concave on I C with
Moreover, by Lemma 8 we have that
as by Assumption 1 the function g is strictly decreasing on supp(q(·|y). It follows that
By symmetry, for two agents y, y ′ ∈ R with y > y ′ > 0,
The Proposition the follows.
B Proof of Proposition 1
In this appendix we prove Proposition 1 using the results of Appendix A. We first derive the following Proposition.
then there always exists a covering Nash equilibrium (C * , {α * C (y)} y∈R , {β * C (·|y)} y∈R ) such that for each community C = (C d , C s ) ∈ C * we have that
where {I C } C∈C * is a set of mutually non-overlapping intervals of equal length.
Proof. As the functions f and g are continuous, if we have that
Furthermore, there exists a ∆ * ≤ ∆ and a integer K such that
and let
Using this definitions, we construct a community structure (C * , {α * C (y) y∈R , {β * C (·|y) y∈R } where
Furthermore y ∈ I k , we let
be the corresponding content demand functions. Using this definitions, the content proudction function β * C k (x|y) of an agent y ∈ I k is then given by β *
Note that this community structure (C * , {α * C (y)} y∈R , {β * C (·|y)} y∈R } has the same structure as given by Proposition 1, i.e. for each community
where {I k } k=1,...,K is a set of mutually non-overlapping intervals of equal length, and we have that
Furthermore as
it follows from Lemma 13 that each community C k , k = 1, ..., K, is a feasible community under the corresponding rate allocations {α C k (y)} y∈I k and {β C k (·|y)} y∈I k }. It then follows that for each
be the corresponding content supply function. Finally, let
Note that by symmetry, we have that for
Again by symmetry we have that
Finally note that for y ∈ I k we have that
Combining the above results with Lemma 14 and Lemma 16, it follows that for y ∈ I k we have that
and therefore we have that α * C * (y) = arg max
Similarly, combining the above results with Lemma 15 and Lemma 17, it follows that for y ∈ I k we have that
and therefore we have that β * C * (·|y) = arg max
It then follows that the community structure (C * , {α * C (y) y∈R , {β * C (·|y) y∈R } is a Nash equilibirum, and as by construction we have that
it is a covering Nash equilibrium.
We are now in the position to prove Proposition 1. First we consider the result that if
then there always exists a covering Nash equilibrium (C * , {α * C (y)} y∈R , {β * C (·|y)} y∈R } such that for each community C = (C d , C s ) ∈ C * we have that
where {I C } C∈C * is a set of mutually non-overlapping intervals of equal length. This result follow directly from Proposition 8.
Futhermore, the result that for each community C = (I C , I C ) ∈ C * we have that 1. α * C (y) = E p , y ∈ I C , and each agent y ∈ R consumes content in exactly one community, follows directly from Lemma 14. 2. β * C (·|y) = E q δ(x * y − x), y ∈ I C , where x * y = arg max x∈R q(x|y)P IC (x), and δ is the Dirac delta function, follows directly Lemma 15. 3. P C (x) is strictly concave on I C with mid(I C ) = arg max
and a support supp(P C ) such that I C ⊆ supp(P C ), follows directly from Lemma 2. 
C Proof for Proposition 2
In this appendix we prove Proposition 2 using the results of Appendix A.
Note that by Lemma 17 for every community C = (I C , I C ) ∈ C * we have that
Furthermore, as (C * , {α * C (y)} y∈R , {β * C (·|y)} y∈R ) is a Nash equilibrium as given by Proposition 1, we have that where l is equal to the length ||I C || of the interval I C . As (C * , {α * C (y)} y∈R , {β * C (·|y)} y∈R } is a Nash equilibrium, we have that The result then follows.
D Proof for Proposition 3
In this appendix we prove Proposition 3 using the results of Appendix A.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that I C = [−∆, ∆], ∆ > 0. Furthermore, using Proposition 7, we have that supp(Q * C ) = I *
where we also used the fact that the function Q C * (x) is symmetric with respect to mid(I C ).
As all agents y ∈ I C produce the optimal content x * y , we can write the total utility rate as x∈I * C r(x|y) Q * C (x)P C (x) − E q α c c dx.
Therefore, in order to prove the Proposition, we have to show that y 0 = mid(I C ) = arg max y∈IC x∈I * C r(x|y) Q * C (x)P C (x) − E q α c c dx.
Without loss of generality, we can assume for the rest of the proof that
where h is the function that we used to define the filtering function r(x|y). If these two assumption are not true, then we trivially have that y 0 = mid(I C ) = arg max y∈IC x∈I * C r(x|y) Q * C (x)P C (x) − E q α c c dx.
To prove the proposition, we will show that Note that the propostion follows from these two results.
For the prove, we use the following notation. We let
and supp(r(x|y)) = [y − ∆ h , y + ∆ h ].
We first show that y 0 = mid(I C ) = arg max y∈IC x∈I * C r(x|y))dx.
To do this, we start out with the case where y ∈ [−∆, 0], and consider the following sub-cases.
If Recall that both Q * C (x) and P C (x) are strictly concave on I * C and that y 0 = mid(I C ) = arg max The proposition then follows.
E Proof for Proposition 4
In this appendix we prove Proposition 4 using the results of Appendix A.
As (C * , {α * C (y)} y∈R , {β * C (·|y)} y∈R ) is a covering Nash equilibrium, note that we have that for y ∈ I C that U is an optimal filtering function, with a total utility rate given by x∈R Q * c (x)P C (x)dx − α C β C c.
As by Assumption 1 we have that supp(Q * C ) ⊆ supp(r * (·|y 0 )), and the result follows.
F Proof for Proposition 5
As (C * , {α * C (y)} y∈R , {β * C (·|y)} y∈R ) is a Nash equilibrium, the total utility rate for content consumption and production over all agents y ∈ I C can be written as y∈C E q (q(x * y |y)P C (x * y ) − α C c)dy.
If the content of agent y ∈ I C is first filtered by an expert y b with y b = x * y , then the rate at which content of type x * (y) produced by agent y will be distributed to all agents in the community is given by q(x * y |y)p(x * y |x * y ) = q(x * y |y)f (0). and the utility rate for content production by y is given by This then establishes the Proposition.
